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Abstract: The process of democratisation in Georgia has its obstacles, mostly connected with cultural
and socio-economic aspects. Political challenges are interlinked with societal attitudes and vice versa.
The historical role of the Orthodox Church in preserving Georgian national identity throughout the cen-
turies is over-compensated for, with frequent clerical involvements in public life. Non-democratic gov-
ernments have made no effort to finalise the process of transition and for two decades the state has
remained in the grey zone between consolidation and autocracy. 2012 was marked as a year for the new
hopes of Georgian democracy, a new government was elected via free and fair elections, but democracy
needs conditions to endure and this paper examines those conditions.
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Introduction
I
n 1989 when Francis Fukuyama hoped for the “end of history” (Fukuyama, 1989,
p. 1–18) it was hard to foresee that the Soviet Union would collapse and, as
a consequence, set in motion the process later ascertained as a fourth wave of dem-
ocratic transition (McFaul, 2002). The uncertainty about the future of the
post-Communist space was twofold; it contained the political anoesis of the liberal
world and academic confusion. Finally, the west unveiled region-specific political
schemes and, subsequently, this treatment played an important role in shaping aca-
demic preferences as well. This pattern can be examined if we take a closer look at
the western efforts serving to help former USSR satellites in Europe on their paths
toward democratic consolidation; there were serious problems and successes, corre-
spondingly reviewed and analysed by scholars.
The Caucasus is a region that probably had the most difficult post-Communist decade.
Severe ethnic conflicts turned into a matter of academic concern. Inescapably, the process
of democratisation in the region lost its academic applicability.
The Georgian Republic was among other states that confirmed their readiness to have
democracy as a main principle for state building, but owing to unforeseen developments
at the beginning of the 90s,1 the country went through the slush of political stagnation and
corruption. The aftermath of two wars left little hope for development, the remnants of
the Soviet industrial legacy were privatised and monopolised by the circles of former
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1 After the 1991–1992 coup d’état, power was taken by a provisional Military Council of the Repu-
blic of Georgia. In February 1992 the Military Council transferred power to the State Council of the Re-
public of Georgia.
Communist officials. Although Eduard Shevardnadze often used the word democracy to
describe his regime, the country was closer to an oligarchy and did not meet even the min-
imum criteria of a democracy.2
After 2003 and the Rose Revolution, the United States and the EU were sparingly op-
timistic about the new political elite that emerged from the young, charismatic leaders.
Georgia was included in the newly launched European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and
welcomed as a partner of NATO. Although there were unseen amounts of reforms initi-
ated and enacted by the government to improve state functioning, evidence gradually
showed that the state machinery was frequently used against its own citizens, violating
the fundamental values of a liberal democracy (Human Rights Watch, 2011–2012).
In 2012, disclosing the facts of torture and ill treatment in Georgian prisons caused
waves of mass protests in the streets. As an outcome, the Government was democratically
changed in scheduled elections. President Saakashvili left office after serving two presi-
dential terms, in 2013.
“What is democracy and what is not” (Schmitter, Karl, 1991)? What are the pre-con-
ditions which facilitate democracy to emerge? What are the factors which help democ-
racy endure? Is democratisation a process which necessarily brings consolidation
(O’Donnell, Schmitter, Whitehead, 1986, p. 6)? Is there a ‘grey zone’? Are hybrid re-
gimes democracies with some problems or autocracies with some democratic features?
Enormous academic work has been done to generate and answer these questions.
There are many different definitions of democracy itself, but modern scholars pay
more attention to answering the questions which focus on the emergence and endurance
of democracy. Some scientists believe that the ‘transition paradigm’ is outdated, and we
should treat the regimes as they are in reality, rather than seeing them at some conditional
point in streaming towards democratic consolidation (Levitsky, Way, 2002, p. 51); others
remain on the ‘transitionalist’ side.
This paper is entirely theoretical and utilises some of the answers to those questions to
explain the state of Georgian democracy. The author believes that Georgia is a state in
transition (which does not mean that other states with the similar features necessarily fall
in the same category), but on the way towards consolidation the state has gone via differ-
ent types of hybrid regimes. To understand the nature of those regimes, and a fortiori the
reasons for their emergence, it is important to analyse political and cultural dimensions of
the state.
The essay will try to answer the questions: who are the main political actors in Geor-
gia? What are the general characteristics of the political parties in power? What are
the important features of Georgian political culture? How do all these relate to the state of
democracy?
Although the work includes some information from the recent historical experience of
the country, it mainly focuses on the period of 2003–2012, and hence how Saakashvili’s
governance shaped the modern image of Georgia.
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2 The minimum requirement of democracy as defined by Joseph Schumpeter and others is a fair
election; during the period of Shevardnadze’s presidency there were frequent reports about electoral
fraud. In 2003 protests were held to support free suffrage, a process ended with the peaceful revolution,
later called the Rose Revolution.
The first part of the paper is dedicated to political and economic factors and their rela-
tion to the process of transition. The second part grasps the cultural issues and their effect
on political life.
Georgian political parties in power
Parties are usually analysed with different approaches which focus on organisational,
ideological or other essential aspects, but for the purposes of this paper I would like to
categorise political units according to electoral causality; to put it another way: the elector-
ates of parties that fall in a defined group value similar criteria for choosing politicians.3
First, people’s parties are the products of popular movements. The leaders do not
come from the political elite; they enjoy innate support from fellow partisans.4 The first
stage of organisational existence is a problem based on limited scope and resources, but
once a movement gains greater support, political ambitions emerge.
Second, leader’s parties5 (Wolinetz, 2002, p. 144) have support because of their lead-
ers, who are mostly charismatic and persuasive enough to be appreciated by the masses.
The existence of parties of this category is usually limited temporally; when personalities
give up politics, the organisations they represent fall apart.
Third, ideological parties are traditional political organisations with defined ideologi-
cal directions. They have enduring systems passed down generations. People support
them because of the principles they represent.
The political history of the independent Georgian Republic does not have much to say
about the democratic struggles between established political units, but, in a limited sense,
it includes all three above-mentioned party types. Overall, as Tarkhan Mouravi argues:
“political parties in Georgia are weak organisations, with low levels of internal democ-
racy and loose structures” (Bader, 2010, p. 75).
At the end of the ‘80s, the anti-Soviet movement peaked in Georgia. It is hard to iden-
tify the leaders of the movement among politicians, because under the totalitarian rules
political struggle was impossible. They had long experience of defending national values
and human rights, but all of their activities were held within the system of an oppressive
state. Foreseeing a situation in which the existing conditions could be substituted for
more favourable ones may have brought about different hypothetical scenarios, but no-
body anticipated the sudden crash of the communist regime. Gorbachev’s perestroika
was in its final stages when Georgian dissidents felt it was the right time to politicise their
activities, demanding full independence from the Communist state. The unique chance to
challenge the Communists in democratic elections required organised parties in opposi-
tion. The 1990 coalition formed by the dissidents was called Round Table – Free Georgia,
symbolising common roots and aspirations of political organisations included. The oppo-
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3 The paper does not seek to go into an in-depth research into party types, the aim is to present broa-
der definitions for the purposes of the paper.
4 Support is innate because in this case leaders of the movement and participants have shared, yet not
politicised beliefs and aspirations.
5 Or leader-centred parties as defined by Wolinetz.
sition won the parliamentary elections and later its leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia became
the first president of Georgia (The Central Election Commission of Georgia, 2010, p. 7).
After the presidential elections, and especially during the period of the military coup, an
organisation emerged from the people’s coalition Round Table that was mostly, and sin-
gle-handedly, associated with the President, accordingly, its supporters were called
Zviad-ists.
Post-coup elections were held in 1992. Eduard Shevardnadze, a former Communist
official and the only candidate accepted by the rebels, was elected through a parallel
direct ballot to the position of Chairman of Parliament and Head of State (Nodia,
Scholtbach, 2006, p. 11). In 1993, he created the Citizens’ Union of Georgia (CUG),
which gained the majority of votes in the next two parliamentary elections (1995, 1999).
During the Shevardnadze period, the Georgian Parliament was very pluralistic, out of
36 political parties 24 managed to exceed the 2% electoral threshold (The Central Elec-
tion Commission of Georgia, 2010, p. 8). Although there were figures within the CUG
like Zurab Zhvania who had self-reliant political credibility, the solidity of the party was
fully built upon its leader’s authority.
Thomas Carothers, in his well-known article, accommodates the CUG’s Georgia into
the grey zone, among countries “which have some attributes of democratic political life”
but “suffer from serious democratic deficits” (Carothers, 2002, p. 9). These types of
countries have already abandoned autocratic rule but cannot progress towards consolida-
tion (Carothers, 2002, p. 10). The author emphasises “feckless pluralism”, presenting it as
the “first syndrome” of the type of system described (Carothers, 2002, p. 10). It is true that
with introducing a new electoral barrier of 5%, there were fewer political organisations
represented in the parliament after the 1995 parliamentary elections, but by that time
a “corrupt, self-interested, and ineffective” (Carothers, 2002, p. 10) political elite had al-
ready been formed, and there was no need for ‘newcomers’.
Shevardnadze’s regime ended with the Rose Revolution in 2003 and soon after, the
CUG disappeared from the political arena. Most of its loyal members had no chance of
a comeback as the opposition; firstly because of Shevardnadze’s retirement and, sec-
ondly, because of the post-revolutionary public attitudes. The new public discourse of-
fered by the leadership left no room for any dialogue with the Ancien Régime; according
to the rhetoric, the CUG had no moral right to be in the public domain, because they had
already brought the country to extreme poverty and stagnation. The public shared the
elite’s aspirations; simultaneously Shevardnadze’s political absence was a crucial ele-
ment in forming an outcome where political dialogue was not on the agenda.
In 2003–2013 the United National Movement (UNM), and its leader Mikheil
Saakashvili, had no parliamentary opposition. Although there were several attempts by
‘street politicians’ to challenge the UNM, no significant results were achieved (Fair-
banks, Gugushvili, 2013, p. 199). The party had full comfort to govern independently,
and absence of political opponents did not seem to be temporary. Political parties in oppo-
sition had very low public support, and at the same time most of them had no resources to
change electoral attitudes. Despite the fact that among UNM members were experienced
politicians, the party remained largely a leader’s party. It is true that during several peri-
ods particular affiliates were promoted to represent the UNM in public, but none of them
was able to present the image of a true leader.
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Two important developments took place in Georgia in 2012–2013: first, a new govern-
ment was elected through free and fair elections. Second, the former governmental party,
the UNM, emerged as a legitimate opposition. This can be considered a historical achieve-
ment of local political life. A person who had supported Saakashvili’s government from the
wings appeared to be the one who brought the regime to an end (Freeman, 2012).
The billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili was a mysterious individual prior to his entrance
into politics in 2011. He had never before appeared on TV screens and his name was pre-
dominantly connected with his long list of charity activities. “I decided to go into politics
because of our Soviet-style government” (Harding, 2012), he explained in an interview
given to The Guardian. According to him, Saakashvili’s government was an autocratic
one and had nothing in common with western democracies, the money he had given to the
UNM was intended to modernise the country, but the leadership took Georgia in the op-
posite direction (Civil.Ge, 2013).
Video footage which leaked from a Georgian prison was a wakeup call for the people.
A new leader without a political past but with a good personal reputation brought new
hope for the opposition. Political parties who could barely reach the threshold to enter
parliament became units of a coalition called Georgian Dream, headed by Ivanishvili.
The coalition won the parliamentary elections in 2012; as a result Bidzina Ivanishvili
became prime minister. After one year, in 2013, the Georgian Dream’s candidate
Giorgi Margvelashvili defeated major rival, the UNM’s David Bakradze, in the presi-
dential runoff.
There is no doubt that Georgian Dream used to be Ivanishvili’s coalition. But the most
interesting thing was still to come. In his first and last public addresses, Ivanishvili clearly
stated that after getting rid of the UNM’s governance, he would leave the political arena
and return to the public sector. He kept his promise, with the introduction of his heir – the
new Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili.
Delegative democracy, competitive authoritarianism or both?
As was already mentioned above, Saakashvili was strongly supported by the west,
mainly because of his political promises to democratise the state. The promises were
partially enacted in documented obligations taken with involvement in the European
Neighbourhood Policy. The officially declared goal of joining NATO also required the
Georgian government to keep on reforming. The state achieved some successes in both
directions, but there were some failures as well.
A frequently discussed outcome of the political shortcomings was NATO’s refusal to
give the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia at the summit in Bucharest 2008
(Gallis, 2008, p. 3). A decline in the Freedom House’s rating followed the same year
(Freedom House, 2008).6
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6 “Georgia’s political rights rating declined from 3 to 4 due to the restrictions placed on political
opposition following the November 2007 emergency declaration, and the civil liberties rating declined
from 3 to 4 due to the circumscription of media and expression in the aftermath of the November pro-
tests.” See: Freedom House.
Saakashvili’s political vigour required a strong, aggressive attitude towards the Rus-
sian Federation; political decisions were frequently justified as securitisation (Buzan,
Waever, De Wilde, 1998, p. 23–26). When a state is not safe from threats to its existence,
democracy can be limited by the government for the purposes of national security. People
were arrested and labelled agents of the Russian Security forces (Kupunia, 2011). The
president continued to demonise the opposition; he had to have an exclusive role in Geor-
gian politics along with his partners from the UNM. Saakashvili postulated that his team
was the sole agent of westernisation within the country. According to the governmental
discourse, those who opposed the UNM opposed westernisation and, accordingly, were
pro-Russians.
There are different classifications of regimes; it is hard to allocate Georgia in one partic-
ular category. For the purposes of this paper I would like to establish whether Georgia is
a democracy with some problems, or an authoritarian state with some democratic features.
Authoritarianism with democratic features is often described as electoral authoritari-
anism, or competitive authoritarianism. Incumbents of the regimes do not want to be
called dictators, consequently elections are regularly held, even though only one political
organisation achieves constant victory.
In the countries where democracy enjoys solid public support, international pressures
on the government might serve as limiters of the incumbent’s autocratic policies, the
same is true of Saakashvili’s regime. The state did not shift towards full scale authoritari-
anism because of the foreign pressure and political bias of the regime. In 2009–2010
when the government adopted the constitutional changes to prepare the state for the par-
liamentary system, many observers believed that with this configuration Saakashvili
“may have intended it to provide a way for him to continue ruling” (Fairbanks, 2014,
p. 154), but he had never openly talked about it, the western organisations and politicians
had clearly expressed that they would not support Saakashvili’s political resurrection af-
ter finishing his second term in presidential office.
The UNM’s regime was a hybrid, not just in the sense of a problematic democracy; or-
ganisationally it included most features of competitive authoritarianism, and simulta-
neously the composition of the decision making process resembled the type of regime
which was classified by Guillermo O’Donnell as a delegative democracy (DD).
Structurally, the country had most of the features of competitive authoritarianism, as
defined by Levitsky and Way. If we take a closer look at their argument about the four
arenas of democratic contestation the similarities are clearer (Levitsky, Way, 2002,
p. 54).7
In competitive authoritarianism, elections are regularly held, but with a “large scale of
the state power, biased media coverage and harassment of opposition candidates and ac-
tivists” (Levitsky, Way, 2002, p. 55), Saakashvili’s regime was often accused of using
state machinery to maintain power. Examples include the mobilisation of high school
teachers and administrative stuff during pre-election campaigns; people were taken from
town to town to meet UNM members and the president; these gatherings were then broad-
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7 The four arenas of democratic competition include: the electoral arena, the legislative arena, the ju-
dicial arena and the media.
cast, to create the image of large scale public support towards the government. The oppo-
sition often stated that people employed in the public services were obliged to vote for
the UNM in order to preserve their jobs. The problems of the Georgian media have been
indicated by the Freedom House, the documents of other international organisations re-
peatedly reported about the illegal limitations imposed on TV broadcasters and press
(Freedom House, 2011). There were cases when the opposition suffered severe abuses, as
investigations have shown, persons connected with the Ministry of Internal Affairs black-
mailed individuals in order to deter them from politics (Democracy & Freedom Watch,
2013).
“Competitive Authoritarian regimes routinely attempt to subordinate the judiciary”
(Levitsky, Way, 2002, p. 56) argue Levitsky and Way, but the UNM’s regime did not
need to take serious actions to do so. Politically obedient courts were an intrinsic feature
inherited from the previous government. Statistics show that by 2010 the acquittal rate in
Georgian courts was no more than one percent (Thomson Reuters, 2011); this literally
meant that everybody who stood in front of the juries had been found guilty in advance.
Even now, when a new government has come to power, some judicial officials previously
affiliated with the UNM help raise doubts about the functioning of the entire system.
As in competitive authoritarianism, the Georgian media were an object of governmen-
tal attacks. The frequency and intensity of the pressure depended on particular circum-
stances and on the political value of the people behind the independent sources of
information. For example, channels that had nationwide coverage were under stricter
control in comparison to those which covered only Tbilisi and its vicinity. Channels
linked with the people who had presented explicit political ambitions were more likely to
suffer than those which only played the role of news distributors. Finally, TV 9, founded
by Bidzina Ivanishvili, helped to change the government.
Delegative democracy (DD) is more about the attitudes of the elite; it pays greater at-
tention to the means of interaction and examines the leader and his/her political account-
ability. O’Donnell points out some attributes of the typical president in DD:
“[In DD] the leader has to heal the nation by uniting its dispersed fragments into a har-
monious whole… the president and his trusted advisors are the Alpha and Omega… Politi-
cal parties, interest groups, or crowds in the streets – have to be ignored” (O’Donnell G.,
1994, p. 60).
All these features are true when describing Saakashvili’s regime. He had enormous
political power; mostly ignored everyone apart from his closest circles to play the role of
saviour and moderniser. He often compared his governmental projects to the period of
the most successful Georgian king, David IV (the builder) (Jawad, 2006, p. 2). Saaka-
shvili’s ambition to leave his mark in history was described as one of his weaknesses by
former US ambassador Richard Miles: “construction projects made the former presi-
dent’s mark in the country but served no economic function” (Georgia News, 2013). The
same diplomat also mentioned that Saakashvili worsened relations with Russia because
of his impatience.
In good representative democracies, decision making is relatively slow in comparison
to DDs, where presidents have “practically no horizontal accountability” (O’Donnell G.,
1994, p. 62). Saakashvili did everything quickly, and the outcomes of his actions were
mostly unsuccessful. He lost popularity, similarly to other leaders of DDs:
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“Presidents in DD tend to suffer wild swings in popularity: one day they are acclaimed
as providential saviours, and the next they are cursed as only fallen gods can be”
(O’Donnell G., 1994, p. 62).
The goal of the new Georgian government, as the former Prime Minister Ivanishvili
clarified several times, is to transform the semi-authoritarian state inherited by the UNM
into a representative, liberal democracy. Undeniably, the challenge is tough and requires
sufficient political mobilisation.
The time given to the Georgian Dream may not be enough even to prepare a functional
framework for the system. Pluralism without institutionalisation often leads to chaos – Geor-
gia already saw this in the ‘90s. Some theorists of democratisation might argue that the ambi-
guity introduced by Ivanishvili with his renunciation might serve as an impetus for real
democratic processes, but others, like Adam Przeworski, may argue that uncertainty can
work in favour of democracy only when “institutions are in place” (Przeworski, 2003, p. 76).
So it seems on the surface that Georgia is moving forward, leaving DD behind. Inas-
much as constitutional changes have entered into force, the Prime Minister Irakli Gari-
bashvili is the one who has to lead the government; he has more accountability both from
the legal and political points of view. Legally, he is responsible for working in tandem
with the parliament, president and the cabinet of ministers. Politically his actions should
fall within the general value framework of the coalition which brought him to the power.
Pre-conditions of democracy
Theorists of democratisation often try to establish the favourable pre-conditions for
democratic consolidation. Some of them assert the criteria which are needed to be in place
to achieve good democracy, others point out that these criteria may just serve as facilita-
tors, but not necessarily lead to consolidation.
“The question is not how a democratic system comes into existence. Rather it is how
a democracy, assumed to be already in existence can best preserve or enhance its health
and stability” (Rustow, 1970, p. 339). Dankwart A. Rustow, in his influential article,
emphasises the factors which help democracy to endure, he is very demanding while ana-
lysing the causality of democratisation, criticising the “endogenous” model of moderni-
sation, and instead of the social pre-conditions proposed by Lipset, gives a single
“background condition” – National Unity (Rustow, 1970, p. 350). For him this condition
is to be “accepted unthinkingly” and even a “vocal consensus” about it can be a cause for
concern (Rustow, 1970, p. 351). Rustow asserts that the next phases of democratisation
are only possible if national unity is taken by everyone for granted. If we try to find this
condition in Georgia, we might touch upon a very serious problem.
The state has two occupied regions with ethnic minorities. Abkhazians and South
Ossetians, and those who do not yet have Russian passports, are de jure considered to be
holders of the rights that all Georgian citizens have. But in reality, as recent historical ex-
perience shows, these people do not associate themselves with the Georgian state. Both
self-declared regimes have Russian political and military support and, therefore, are fully
controlled by the Kremlin. Simultaneously, as the international economic embargo is in
force, their regimes are highly dependent on Russia (BBC, 2013). After two wars and the
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complete separation of the former compatriots, hostile political establishments and Rus-
sian involvement are making dialog impossible. Accordingly, there is nothing extraordi-
nary in the Abkhazian and South Ossetian adverse attitudes toward the Georgian State.
The first and fundamental problem regarding national unity lies in the sovereignty
of the Georgian state. The official jurisdiction of Georgia does not, in reality, extend over
the regions and people in the way it is declared in the constitution. The second problem
is a result of the first one, in that, from the very beginning, Georgian governments made
some serious political mistakes while dealing with the institutionalisation of the bureau-
cratic legacy of the occupied territories. And third, Saakashvili’s government not only
followed the wrong path but made it even more complicated.
The Georgian state is not willing to waive its claim to the occupied regions, and these
aspirations are rightfully upheld by the western democracies, but the problem that comes
along with this struggle lies in the partial neglect of nation building. If any of the govern-
ments have focused on the future, they have done so without understanding or accepting
the present.
After the conflict in Abkhazia, Shevardnadze brought almost the full spectrum of in-
stitutions of the Autonomous Republic to Tbilisi, including the Government of the Au-
tonomous Republic of Abkhazia, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Abkhazia and,
ironically, even city halls and ministries which were operating before the war were lo-
cated in the capital.
Nobody had considered the fact that useless institutions could generate bad cultural
outcomes. The chief of the police of the town of Gagra, the mayor of Sokhumi, the head
of the government of Abkhazia, and many others – these were all officials without any
other function than to serve a purpose that might be called illusion making. As a conse-
quence, the Georgian citizens themselves were left confused.8
The structure created alienated internally displaced persons, or IDPs; for example,
when local children from the high schools of Tbilisi are taken for the medical check re-
quired by the Ministry of Defence of Georgia in groups (according to their place of resi-
dence), IDP children have to go separately to the Commissariat of the Abkhazian
Autonomous Republic.
Compact settlements of IDPs, which were everywhere in Georgia, had a kind of cul-
tural ghetto effect. The people who lived there were mostly related families, or families
who lived together, or knew each other before the war and had no real need or opportuni-
ties to be fully integrated in the local, very specific Tbilisian community. The term refu-
gee was used (at least) as frequently as internally displaced in public.9
IDPs had to overcome the negative attitudes of locals, but these attitudes were mostly
caused by social problems. The refugees were additional trouble for the poor state, and
this issue was easily converted to create scapegoats out of them. To clarify, there was no
real feeling of unity between IDPs and locals, and the government helped this negative
trend to endure through bad political decisions.
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8 Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons is responsible IDP problems.
9 Merriam Webster Dictionary: “Refugee – someone who has been forced to leave a country because
of war or for religious or political reasons,” –Georgian war victims who lived in Georgia were internally
displaced [Author].
When a person lives in one town but officially belongs to another which unfortunately
no longer exists, or never existed for him/her (due to being part of a new generation), a de-
cision has to be made. Choosing a new reality should not be a moral compromise made by
the people; the government is the institution capable of doing an “immoral” thing and
making it right for the state interests. Officials should ensure every person’s full integra-
tion in the community of citizens.
Mikheil Saakashvili was considered to be a great moderniser of the country, but in-
stead of fixing the problems that I have mentioned above he went further, establishing the
Temporary Administration of South Ossetia. The project was promoted and advertised
broadly, with music videos, concerts and so on. His populist decisions, which were illus-
trated using military footage, had an exclusively negative impact, especially if we look
back, considering the outcomes of the five day war in August 2008.10
Rustow’s article was an answer to the scholarly debate in which Seymour Martin
Lipset contributed, underlining certain social requisites as an essential factor in the emer-
gence of democracy. He argued that if a legitimate state has enough wealth and a high
level of industrialisation and urbanisation combined with a good literacy rate, the politi-
cal system is more likely to be a democratic one (Lipset, 1959, p. 69–105). Adam
Przeworski and Fernando Limongi are among those academics who accentuate the posi-
tive role of economic development but they argue that: “[t]he emergence of democracy is
not a by-product of economic development,” and “[o]nly once it is established do eco-
nomic constraints play a role: the chances for the survival of democracy are greater when
the country is richer” (Przeworski, Limongi, 1997, p. 177). The main idea of Prze-
worski’s work emphasises the role of social conditions in consolidating democracy, but it
avoids Lipset’s “optimistic equation”11 where democracy is considered to be a direct out-
come of modernisation. Guillermo O’Donnell confronted Lipset’s modernisation para-
digm, coming to the conclusion that economic development may lead to the rise of
bureaucratic authoritarianism (O’Donnell G. A., 1973, p. 1–48). Samuel Huntington sees
a significant role for modernisation in bringing positive social changes, but at the same
time he does not share the optimism that economic development will necessarily lead to
democracy (Huntington, 1968). He argues that if there is a “lack of civic morale and pub-
lic spirit and political institutions capable of giving a meaning and direction to the public
interest. Not political development but political decay dominated [dominates – L.M.] the
scene” (Huntington, 1968, p. 4).
Social conditions
In Georgia for the last two decades there has been an almost total absence of the fac-
tors necessary for development of democracy. Economic growth has been steady, but ac-
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10 The military videos served to raise public expectations of the Georgian Army – those expectations
were too high, before facing Russian aggression and, as an outcome of the lost war, citizens received
another disappointment.
11 The term “optimistic equation” is used by Guillermo A. O’Donnell; “More Socio-Economic Deve-
lopment = More Likelihood of Political Democracy.”
companied by increasing foreign debts. Low GDP per capita, combined with high
inequality in wealth distribution, makes the overall picture even murkier. Even though
the university acceptance rate is high, this is not reflected in overall levels of education. The
lack of qualified teachers in higher education is reflected in worrisome literacy statistics.
Graph 1 is useful to show the approximate state of the Georgian economy; it shows
GDP per capita comparisons in the last decade. The graph is generated from statistics
prepared by the World Bank and the data includes Georgia’s closest neighbours (Azer-
baijan, Armenia) and one EU state – Bulgaria, which has the lowest average GDP among
the 28 EU members. All these states had to deal with a Communist legacy, and only
Bulgaria is designated by the Freedom House as ‘free’. Azerbaijan is an oil rich country
and accordingly, has solid GDP growth, exceeding that of Bulgaria in 2012. Georgia
and Armenia retain relatively similar statistics, but the former has a better rating for de-
mocracy.
If we take into consideration the “optimistic paradigm of modernisation,” Georgia has
a long road ahead of it to reach the economic threshold. Simultaneously, the country’s
Gini index is the worst among the post-Soviet states (Fact Check, 2013). Substantial in-
equalities in wealth distribution serve as an obstacle for the emergence of a politically
aware citizenry.
Huge military expenditure was justified by Saakashvili’s government as an unavoid-
able answer to the security challenges they faced. This argument was well promoted and
was never a matter of broad political discussion. Giving priority to unmerited military re-
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forms and retaining a relatively large standing army, kept civilian education out of bud-
getary preferences.
According to recent polls conducted by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), so-
cial problems remain the biggest concern for citizens. The majority of the population does
not feel the effects of any significant economic improvements after the governmental
change; nevertheless, the Georgian Dream coalition is still the most popular political or-
ganisation (Navarro, 2013).
Political culture
Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba introduced a complex approach to political cul-
ture and its role in democracy. The authors argue that a “democratic model of states requires
more than formal institutions” (Almond, Verba, 1989, p. 3). Civic culture, for them, is what
makes democracy consolidated and enduring. This is a public culture which includes the
political attitudes, norms, and values of both the elite and the citizenry. These researchers
first identified political orientation types, dividing them into three categories: cognitive ori-
entation, affective orientation and evaluational orientation (Almond, Verba, 1989, p. 14).
The cognitive orientation includes general knowledge of the political system, affec-
tive orientation deals with the feelings about the political system and its subjects, and
evaluational orientation is a mixed judgment of the political system involving both feel-
ings and knowledge (Almond, Verba, 1989, p. 14).
Out of these categories, the researchers generated questions for the populations of the
five countries. The research results were theorised and presented in cultural patterns.
A subject political culture describes a public which is aware of the political system,
sees the outputs of policies, but fails to see the inputs and especially the “role of the self as
an active participant” (Almond, Verba, 1989, p. 17). The citizens are like observers and
do not feel their responsibilities and importance in the democratic process. The public
knows the government, has construed attitudes and feelings towards the policies; how-
ever the judgments are passive and rarely lead to concrete actions.
During the Georgian presidential elections in 2013, only 46% of registered voters
came to the ballot boxes. This low political turnout might not be rare, even in European
states, but in the Georgian context, more participation was expected. Presumably the bal-
loting was a last step to finalise the process of governmental change – supported by the
majority of citizens, but less than half took the responsibility to go and vote. The Geor-
gian political attitude includes the most of the elements of a subject political culture as de-
fined by Almond and Verba.
The authors of the approach consider the development of political culture in Britain as
an example of civic evolution. They argue that a civic culture is a mixture of the past and
present. These two cultural sets interact, via clashes between modernisation and tradition-
alism; the clashes can be strong, but not strong enough to ensure the victory of one side or
the other, even if temporarily stronger. The outcome of these clashes is a value consensus,
which leads to an enduring political balance (Almond, Verba, 1989, p. 5).
In Georgia, traditional values are mostly associated with the Orthodox Church. The
institution apparently played a considerable role in preserving Georgian national identity
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throughout the centuries, and nowadays possesses enormous influence on the society.
According to polls, the Patriarch Ilia II is the most trusted personality, and correspond-
ingly he represents a dominant public institution (International Republican Institute,
2011, p. 34). The special status of the Georgian Church was authorised by the government
with the constitutional agreement. The concordat between the state and the patriarchate
gives the religious institution full freedom and significant material benefits.
Elizabeth H. Prodromou argues that “orthodox Christianity and democracy are com-
patible,” but the Church holds certain ambivalence in attitudes toward pluralism
(Prodromou, 2004, p. 62). In the case of the Georgian Orthodox Church, the theological
understanding of pluralism is not the main problem which serves as an obstacle for the
emergence of a democratically aware citizenry.
The Soviet Perestroika loosened state control over ideologies. Accordingly, Geor-
gians were granted a limited opportunity to rebound from complete atheism and return to
the Church. Being a Christian, by that time, was equivalent to being opposed to the Soviet
Union. Religion embedded defiance of the totalitarian regime. Orthodoxy served as an
ideological vehicle for attaining independence. The tradition of religiosity had been lost
during the 70 years of Communist rule; newly emerged Christians did not have any reli-
gious knowledge, but they possessed a strong need for cultural disobedience. The stron-
gest antagonistic values, by that time, could be found in the realm of God. I would like to
argue that the re-Christianisation of Georgians was shaped by the political and cultural
environment, and therefore the idea of the Georgian independent state remained more
meaningful than the idea of organised religion.
On 9 April, 1989, Russian tanks were approaching Rustaveli Avenue, Tbilisi. Thou-
sands of protesters stood in the middle of the road between St. George’s Church and the
Soviet Government House. Trying to avoid possible bloodshed, Patriarch Ilia II ad-
dressed the people, asking them to go inside the Church to pray. But the public confronted
him, staying for a tenacious civil protest. Subsequently, soldiers equipped with sharpened
spades reached the area and soon after there were violent clashes. After the massacre,
21 protesters were slaughtered, more than 300 were injured.
The night was a victory for positive secularism: people felt the intrinsic difference be-
tween civic and religious spirituality. Unfortunately, the momentum did not last long, af-
ter gaining independence, attitudes towards the state and the Church changed. A bloody
coup d’état, two wars and a severe economic crisis generated public disappointment in
the Georgian state. The political frustration initiated a second wave of re-Christianisation
of the vast majority of citizens. The Georgian Orthodox Church expanded, obtaining
more and more adherents.
Georgians were unaware of statehood because they had never lived in an independent
democratic state.12 Their earlier expectations about independence were absolutely differ-
ent from what actually occurred. Instead of acquiring the necessary skills for civic life,
they had relinquished the role of active participants in political processes and, in lieu, af-
filiated themselves to an institution with God given legitimacy.
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12 The first democratic republic of Georgia existed only for three years 1918–1921.
These developments were pragmatically backed by the political elite. The corrupt
government had never cherished democratic aspirations. Shevardnadze needed stability
and passive citizens. He backed the Church and publicly attended services; he was even
baptised by the patriarch. This peaceful coexistence was legalised with the concordat.
Saakashvili continued the same practice in his relations with the Church.
Verba and Almond explain that the British case of the formation of civic culture is
unique, and others do not necessarily follow the pattern, but I find their arguments plausi-
ble. The fact that there has not been even a single clash between traditionalism and mod-
ernism in Georgia in which the participating parties had roughly similar qualitative power
means that one actor holds the most of the societal influence.
On 17 May a demonstration of LGBT activists was violently attacked by thousands of
citizens, actions which “had been accompanied, supported and encouraged” by the reli-
gious authorities (Amnesty International, 2013). Finally, the police were able to ensure
the safety of victims. This event serves as an illustration of the social influence of the
Church, and clarifies Prodromou’s arguments. Unfortunately, the authorities were cau-
tious even in their condemnation of these violent actions, and therefore no real legal mea-
sures were taken against the abusers.
Dealing with Messianism
In a lengthy letter explaining his reasons for leaving politics, Ivanishvili presented
thought-provoking points; notably, he stated that with his renouncement, political life
would eventually become more pluralistic; a defeated, but legitimate UNM in opposition
and a government coalition which consists of divergent political subjects clearly contrib-
ute to the plausibility of the assumption. The new political spectrum seems peculiarly be-
reft of charismatic leaders; it might be a challenge and/or a new beginning for parties to
become more organised and ideologically coherent.
Furthermore, the former PM mentioned his eagerness to transfer his activities from
the political sphere to the public sector. The aim, as he declared it, is to aid society to mod-
ify its outdated political attitudes. Among the old-fashioned civic values, the ‘Messiah
problem’ was strongly highlighted. Earlier in 2011 Thomas de Waal argued that “Georgia
has a messiah problem” (de Waal, 2011) – political leaders have Messianic pathos and the
public likes this discourse. In a similar manner, Bidzina Ivanishvili asserted that the con-
stant search for a Messiah is a sign of the political immaturity of the Georgian citizenry;
citizens who voted for the Georgian Dream did not form their choice by reason of evaluat-
ing the manifesto proposed by the coalition, they voted against the unjust regime of
Saakashvili, “I don’t want to turn into a new Messiah, we should end the epoch of
Messianism in Georgia” – Ivanishvili declared.
Both De Waal and Ivanishvili alluded to the low level of political culture in Georgia.
Arguably, the term Messianism may be applied to characterise Georgian public prefer-
ences in the political process; particularly, if we take the popularity of the ‘leader’s par-
ties’ into closest consideration, but if we utilise a more detailed approach we might find
out that Georgian citizens vote for the leaders because of the weakness of political organi-
sations. I argue that Messianism might be a cultural challenge, but insofar as the condi-
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tions to test the assumption have never been in place, correlating the attitude to political
immaturity may be misleading. Furthermore, voting against rather than for someone does
not necessarily only happen in politically old-fashioned societies. Bill Durodié, review-
ing modern western societies, argues: “[w]hen people do vote, it is often on a negative
basis – against an incumbent, rather than for a replacement” (Durodié, 2005, p. 5) – ac-
cordingly, this negativity in political preferences is not specific to states with little politi-
cal tradition.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to examine the most important obstacles to Georgia’s
democratic consolidation. Structurally, these problems are interlinked in a functionalist
manner, on the one hand they act together as subsystems of the whole organism, but on
the other hand each of the factors has independent paths of development. For example, in
the Georgian context at least two important conditions need to be in place to achieve na-
tional unity: first, a secular citizenry and second, the political will. If the concept of a sec-
ular public is more or less clear, it is important to clarify what is the meaning of political
will. The political elites should learn to confront the Church, even if this confrontation is
outside their comfort zone. This confrontation might cause a long term struggle between
traditionalists and modernists. This is a situation where the process is more important
than the outcome; it will help citizens to see the difference between spiritual and public
values. Finally, religious differences (or public differences caused by religious beliefs)
will be less important insofar as a consensus on public values is achieved.
If real plurality seems to be a long term goal in current conditions,13 there is room for
optimism in the public sphere. Georgians agree that democracy should be “the only game
in town” (Linz, Stepan, 1996, p. 14), they acknowledge the importance of the rule of law,
and the public feels the value of a free media.
There are some positive impulses from the government as well. Together with the Or-
thodox Church, four other religious groups will receive state funding (Civil.Ge, 2014);
this step might be considered as a gesture of willingness to develop a positive secular
approach.
Hopes in the political arena are apparent as well. In the near future, the broadly dis-
cussed Messiah problem might lose its relevance, as leader’s parties are no longer present
in the political domain.
The planned signing of the association agreement with the EU might serve as a boost
for democracy, but the real test for the new government will be the next parliamentary
elections. As Yonatan L. Morse argues: “[e]lections that were restorative in nature had an
expected onetime boost in democratic quality, while elections that were foundational
were much more volatile” (Morse, 2012, p. 74). The voting in 2012 was of that ‘restor-
ative nature’, the foundational election will come in the future.
PP 3 ’14 Transition toward democracy – Georgian problems 199
13 Plurality here is not only about the public acceptance of religions other than Orthodox Christianity,
it also includes plurality in terms of personal lives and attitudes which are condemned by the Church.
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Tranzycja w kierunku demokracji – problemy Gruzji
Streszczenie
Proces demokratyzacji w Gruzji ma swoje trudnoœci, g³ównie zwi¹zane z aspektem kulturowym
i spo³eczno-ekonomicznym. Wyzwania polityczne s¹ powi¹zane z postaw¹ spo³eczn¹ i odwrotnie. His-
toryczna rola koœcio³a prawos³awnego w zachowaniu gruziñskiej to¿samoœci narodowej przez wieki jest
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nadmiernie kompensowana z czêstymi pisarskimi uwik³aniami w ¿yciu publicznym. Niedemokratyczne
rz¹dy dokona³y wszelkich starañ, aby sfinalizowaæ proces transformacji i przez dwie dekady stan pozo-
stawa³ w szarej strefie miêdzy konsolidacj¹ i autokracj¹. Rok 2012 zosta³ oznaczony rokiem dla nowych
nadziei demokracji Gruzji. Nowy rz¹d zosta³ wybrany przez wolnych i uczciwych wyborców, ale demo-
kracja wymaga warunków aby przetrwaæ i ten artyku³ je bada.
S³owa kluczowe: Gruzja, demokratyczne przemiany, kultura polityczna, Saakaszwili, Koœció³ Pra-
wos³awny
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